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Issue definition and the opinion-policy link:
public preferences and health care spending
in the US and UK
STUART N. SOROKA and ELVIN T. LIM
Abstract
This article explores the extent to which yearly changes in health spending reflect yearly
changes in public preferences. Time series modelling suggests that health care spending is
remarkably more responsive to yearly changes in public opinion in the US than in the UK.
A content analysis of party manifestos suggests the significant role of ‘issue definition’ in
accounting for this difference. Health care issues in the US have more often been viewed as
problems of expenditure, while UK policy-makers have tended to focus on efficiency. Results
suggest that the responsiveness of health care expenditures to public preferences in the 
US and UK is linked to the way in which health care issues are differently defined by 
policy-makers.
The link between public preferences and public policy is at the heart of
democratic theory. Robert Dahl (1971, 1) writes, for instance, that: ‘... a
key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals’.
Indeed, there is a growing body of literature that seeks to measure democ-
racy in terms of government responsiveness to public preferences, and this
work has provided insights into both the nature of political representation
and the responsiveness of the policy-making process.
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Very little empirical research on this subject has been done outside the
US, unfortunately, and no individual work has attempted to find directly
comparable measures of both public opinion and policy.1 As a conse-
quence, while we suspect that the US system is particularly responsive, we
have very few points of comparison. In addition we know almost nothing
about the responsiveness of public policy to public preferences in other
countries. Benjamin Page (1994, 25) asks: ‘Under what circumstances is
this impact larger or smaller? ... What kinds of political systems are more
responsive to their citizens? ... What types of institutions are more or less
responsive than others?’ We are still unable to answer these questions.
The current article represents a first step in this direction, through an
investigation of the relationship between public preferences and health care
spending in the US and UK. Health care is a particularly interesting topic
to compare across these two countries. From a health policy perspective,
the US and UK represent opposite ends of the international spectrum. The
UK National Health Service (NHS) is one of the oldest and most com-
prehensive publicly-funded health care systems; in the US, Medicare and
Medicaid only provide health care for the elderly and poor (along with 
a number of smaller federal and state programmes), and the majority of
the US population is either covered by private insurance or not covered at
all. Whereas the UK is a predominantly public system, the US health care
system is by and large a private one.
From the perspective of those interested in the opinion-policy link,
Lawrence Jacobs’ (1993) work provides a valuable starting point. Jacobs
emphasises the importance of public opinion in the creation of the NHS
and Medicare. Strong public support in the US and UK, Jacobs suggests,
played a critical role in overcoming obstacles such as opposition by
doctors, and—in the case of the US—a comparatively weak state. Jacobs’
research has been fundamental to our understanding of the creation of the
NHS and Medicare, and more generally of the role of public opinion in
policy-making. It does not address the role opinion may have played in
the evolution of health care systems over the past four decades, however.
While the current research speaks to the more general health policy litera-
ture, then, it also represents an effort to add to previous work on the rela-
tionship between public opinion and health care policy in the US and UK.
We begin with a time series analysis, examining to what extent yearly
changes in health spending reflect yearly changes in public preferences for
spending. Results point to significant variation in the responsiveness of
health spending to public preferences across the two countries. More
specifically, it appears as though health spending in the US is remarkably
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responsive to yearly changes in public opinion, while in the UK it is 
not.
Having identified significant differences in the nature of health care
spending in the US and UK, we then ask what might account for these dif-
ferences. There are several possible explanations, of course. Nevertheless,
where health care is concerned it appears as though problem definition has
played a critical role. Health care issues in the US have most often been
viewed as problems of expenditure, while UK governments have tended to
focus on considerations of efficiency. This difference in focus is illustrated
below through a content analysis of party manifestos in both countries.
These results, juxtaposed with the preceding time series analyses, suggest
that problem definition significantly explains why the US is more respon-
sive than the UK to public preferences on health care spending.
Exploring the opinion-policy link: time series analysis
The literature examining the link between public preferences and public
opinion generally follows one of two methods. Opinion-policy ‘congruence’
analyses examine the degree to which changes in opinion and policy tend
to be in the same direction across two points in time, and across various
policy areas. Page and Robert Shapiro (1983) find, for instance, that
changes in policy tend to be congruent with changes in opinion registered
one year earlier about 66 per cent of the time (in the US, between 1935 and
1979, and in cases where policy change was evident). More recently, using
a related methodology, Alan Monroe (1998) finds that opinion-policy ‘con-
sistency’ in the US declined to about 55 per cent from 1980 to 1993, and
explores the extent to which this consistency varies across policy domains.2
A second, more rigorous, method used to study the link between public
policy and public opinion is time series modelling. Because time series
models examine ongoing relationships between preferences and spending
over extended periods, they present more persuasive evidence of the causal
links that run between opinion and policy. And they also propose a more
zealous definition of representation: yearly variations in opinion, these
studies suggest, should be reflected in yearly variations in public spending.
For example, Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett (1992) explore the extent
to which yearly changes in US defence spending in year t are related to
public preferences for spending in year t - 1 from 1965 to 1990.3 Work
by Christopher Wlezien (1995 and 1996) suggests not only that defence
spending might be responsive to public opinion, but also that opinion may
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react ‘thermostatically’ to changes in spending. In short, policy-makers
increase defence spending (partly) in response to public preferences for
more spending and in the subsequent year the public reacts to this change
in spending: ‘In effect, the public would behave like a thermostat, so that
when policy differed from the favoured policy temperature (which could
itself change) the public would send a signal to adjust policy accordingly
and, once sufficiently adjusted, the signal would stop’ (Wlezien 1996, 82).
Drawing in large part on these time series analyses, the current article
uses a relatively simple autoregressive distributed lag model to examine
the policy-opinion link in health care. First, however, Figure 1 illustrates
the series of primary interest. Yearly changes in public spending on health
care are shown in millions of National Currency Units (NCUs).4 In both
cases, the figures reflect total public health expenditures; in the US, this
includes both federal and state health spending. The public preferences
measure is based on questions similar to the following: ‘Do you think the
government is spending too much, too little or about the right amount on
health care?’ The proportion of ‘too much’ responses is subtracted from
the proportion of ‘too little’ responses to create a measure of net support
for health care spending (as in Wlezien 1995 and 1996). For the US, yearly
results are based on data from the General Social Survey (GSS). Two years
for which there is no GGS poll are filled in using results from other poll-
sters using similar questions at almost the same time of year. UK prefer-
ences are based on data from Gallup (in King 2001).5
Summarising the trends depicted in Figure 1, we see that public spend-
ing on health care in the US has generally increased from the late 1960s
to the present. In contrast, spending on health care in the UK has both
increased and decreased. The story for public preferences is almost the
opposite. While a majority of the public always supports additional health
care spending in both countries, the US net support measure moves back
and forth between about 40 per cent and 70 per cent, dipping down briefly
in 1994 (the time of the failure of the Clinton plan). In the UK, prefer-
ences move monotonically from being quite low in the late 1960s to
remarkably high from the mid-1980s onwards. Indeed, by 1989, there is
an 80-point gap between those saying they want more spending and those
saying they want less.
These data suggest that varying public support for increased health
spending in the US has met with increases in health expenditures, while
steadily increasing public support for additional health spending in the UK
has met with minimal changes in health expenditures. These are only pre-
liminary observations, of course. Drawing directly from work on defence
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spending in the US (outlined above), our more rigorous test of the rela-
tionship between the two series takes the form of a relatively simple autore-
gressive distributed lag (ADL) model:
DSpt is yearly changes in government spending on health care. We differ-
ence the spending series (subtract the previous year’s value from the current
DSp P Govt Prest Preft t t= + + +[ ]- - -a b b b1 1 2 1 3 1
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Figure 1: Health care expenditures and public opinion
value), and use changes in, rather than levels of, spending for both (i) 
theoretical and (ii) methodological reasons. (i) Last year’s spending is the
common starting point when budgets are made for the current year.
Accordingly, budgets are often made with changes in, rather than with
levels of, spending in mind; in addition, the public probably reacts to
changes in rather than levels of spending. (ii) Spending series are often inte-
grated (the autocorrelation coefficient is not significantly different from
1.0), and this creates significant problems for statistical modelling. We
avoid this integration problem by using differenced versions of these time
series, and so a standard ADL model can be used.6
PPref is the measure of public preferences for spending on health care,
described above. Govt controls for the party in government. In the UK, it
is a dummy variable equal to 1 when Labour is in power; in the US, it is
a continuous variable representing the average proportion of Democrats
in the House and Senate. The US model also includes Pres—a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 when the president is a Democrat. The model thus allows
for representation by two means: (1) yearly responsiveness to public
opinion, and (2) changes in representation as a consequence of elections.
It is during the previous fiscal year that spending plans are being made for
the current year, so changes in health expenditures in the current fiscal year
(t) are modelled as a product of public preferences and the party in gov-
ernment in the previous fiscal year (t - 1). The analysis is performed using
data from fiscal years 1975 to 1995—the years for which public opinion
data are regularly available in both countries.7
The results are presented in Table 1. A Democratic president appears 
to have a positive effect on health care spending (column 1), but the 
coefficient is significant only at p < .10. The proportion of Democrats in
Congress has no significant effect. Most importantly for our purposes, 
US public preferences at t - 1 have a positive and statistically significant
effect on changes in US health spending at t. On average, a 1-point increase
in net support for spending in year t - 1 leads to an increase of 686 million
(1995) dollars spent on health care in year t.
The same cannot be said for the UK model (column 3). Neither party
of government, nor public preferences, have a significant effect on health
spending. To ensure that positive results in the US are not simply the
product of a greater sample size, the US analysis is repeated in column 2
using only those dates for which UK preferences data are also available.
The preferences variable remains positive and significant. Both US and UK
models have also been re-estimated dropping individual cases from, and
adding additional controls to, the analysis.8 In every case, conclusions
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remain the same. Public spending preferences appear to have much more
significant year-to-year effect on health expenditures in the US than in the
UK.
Accounting for cross-country differences: content analysis 
of party manifestos
Why does health care spending in the US appear to be responsive to public
preferences, while health care spending in the UK does not? The sheer size
of the NHS may mean that the kind of responsiveness of the sort that we
are measuring is simply impossible, while smaller, more flexible, US health
care programmes may appear much more responsive in the short term. The
characterisation of US programmes as small is not so convincing, however.
US (federal and state) governments currently spend more on health care
as a proportion of GDP than does the UK government, in spite of the fact
that most individuals in the US receive few or no state benefits. Moreover,
Medicaid and other programmes are wholly administered and partly
funded by the states and it seems unlikely that such a decentralised pro-
gramme—in a system of government built to be incremental and unre-
Stuart N. Soroka and Elvin T. Lim
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Table 1: Modelling the opinion-policy relationship, 1975–1995
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Public Spending on Health Care
(Differenced, billions)
US UK
All Data Years w/UK Data only All Data
Party of Pres’tt-1 5.789a 3.789 —
(2.854) (3.870)
Party of Gov’tt-1 -.039 .001 .437
(.283) (.332) (.608)
Preferencest-1 .686*** .631** .022
(.138) (.173) (.018)
Constant -28.007 -26.647 -1.051
(15.389) (17.141) (1.406)
N 21 17 17
Rsq/Adj Rsq 620/.553 .555/.452 .116/-.010
BG LMstat .076 .157 .734
Note: Cells contain OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
a p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
sponsive—would be more responsive at the national level in the short term
than a centrally organised system in which the state is both purchaser and
provider.
It may simply be true that US governments pay more attention to public
preferences than do UK governments. Both Grant Jordan and Jeremy
Richardson (1982) and Gary Freeman (1985) suggest that different coun-
tries will have different policy styles—prevailing methods or frameworks
for making public policy.9 Most relevant to the current line of inquiry,
Richardson and Jordan note that policy-making in the UK tends to happen
behind closed doors and with little concern for or attention to the public.
This certainly fits with historical descriptions of health policy-making in
the UK, particularly under Margaret Thatcher. In fact, accounts of health
policy-making in the UK typically make no mention of the role of public
opinion in the policy process (e.g. Ham 1999; Klien 1995; Webster 1998),
while similar discussions of the US almost invariably make mention of the
role of public opinion (e.g. Rushevsky and Patel 1998; Skocpol 1994;
Weissert and Weissert 1996). Although our method of investigation is dif-
ferent, the preceding time series analysis supports the widespread—if not
always explicitly acknowledged—belief that public opinion plays a much
more powerful role in health policy-making in the US than in the UK.
As much as it might be the product of institutional differences, the com-
parative lack of responsiveness in UK health care expenditures might also
be derivative of the way in which health care policies have been differently
defined by UK and US policy-makers. A considerable body of literature
suggests that problem definition can have a significant impact on policy-
making (Cobb and Elder 1972; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). Scholars in
this tradition argue that the ‘social construction’ of issues can affect policy
via any of a variety of ways (Spector and Kitsuse 1977; Seidman and 
Rappaport 1986). Participants involved in policy-making can be affected
by the redefinition of an issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993); the active
manipulation of images of conditions by competing political actors can
affect how (and if) problems are dealt with by policy-makers (Stone,
Deborah A. (1989) ‘Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas’.
Political Science Quarterly 104 (2): 281:300); finally, and most pertinent
to the current line of inquiry, the way in which a problem is defined by
policy-makers is intimately linked to the means by which they deal with
that problem.
The way in which health care issues could have been differently defined
in the US and UK can be explored empirically through a content analysis
of major party manifestos (or party platforms as they are called in the
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US).10 The content analytic approach of using textual evidence as a proxy
for measuring latent ‘reality’ is not new and has been described and
defended by Bernard Berelson (1952), Harold Lasswell (1965), Ole Holsti
(1969) and others.11 Recent work has used content analysis to explore a
wide variety of issues, including legislators’ political ideologies, the effects
of campaign advertising on voter turnout and the effects of stare decisis
on Supreme Court justices’ decisions (Hill et al. 1997; Finkel and Geer
1988; Segal and Spaeth 1996). As in all these cases, the aim of content
analysis is to extract data from political texts. In this case, its purpose is
to discern, on a quantitative metric, the ways in which health care policy
is discussed by political actors in the US and UK.
The content analysis is applied to American and British party manifestos
from 1964 to 2001. We use party manifestos since they are significant and
readily comparable texts that express the publicly professed goals of polit-
ical actors.12 We take manifestos as a readily available indication of the
nature of, and debate about, political issues over time. We assume, accord-
ingly, that the way in which health policy is defined in manifestos is similar
to the way in which it is defined in the political arena. More precisely, we
assume that the way in which health care policies are framed in party man-
ifestos is roughly reflective of the terms by which those policies are dis-
cussed by governments.
Using a keyword-in-context programme, we identified 1187 references
to health and extracted a uniform context of about 15 words before and
after the occurrence of the word. Of these text tokens, 37 made metaphori-
cal reference to health (e.g. ‘the health of our nation’). These were dropped
from the analysis, leaving 1150 text tokens that were then manually coded
into one of five possible categories:
1. General policy references: tokens making an indirect or general refer-
ence to health or to health policy, without making reference to par-
ticular policies, and without making explicit reference to items 3, 4,
or 5 (below).
During the last eight years of Democratic administrations, this nation
has taken giant steps forward in assuring life and health for its citi-
zens. (Democratic, 1968)
2. Specific policy references: tokens referring to a specific health policy
or recommendation, but without making explicit reference to items 3,
4, or 5 (below).
To fight AIDS, the government has undertaken the biggest health edu-
cation campaign ever seen in this country, one much admired abroad,
Stuart N. Soroka and Elvin T. Lim
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and is fully supporting the Medical Research Council in a special pro-
gramme of research towards treatments and vaccines.’ (Conservative,
1987)
3. Non-monetary resources: tokens reflecting a concern for non-
monetary resources, such as human resources or research and 
development.
Particular emphasis should be given to programs which educate nurses
and other health professionals and related personnel ... (Democrat,
1980)
4. Expenditure (monetary resources): tokens explicitly referring to 
government health spending.
Labour will reverse the Tory cuts, improve and expand services so 
that they can complement the much better community health services
we shall provide. This will involve increasing spending by at least 4
per cent a year in real terms. (Labour, 1983)
5. Efficiency: tokens explicitly referring to the management, organisation
and efficacy of health services.
The new unitary structure of the health service and its close co-
operation with the new local authorities will help to ensure more 
effective joint planning of hostels and homes and a better deployment
of nurses and other staffs. (Labour, 1970)
Results of the content analysis are shown in Table 2. Significant differences
appear to occur across countries rather than across parties, suggesting that
the language used in manifestos does indeed reflect cross-country differ-
ences in the definition of health care policies. The fact that US party mani-
festos appear to make many more references to health care is largely the
product of manifesto length—US manifestos during this period are on
average 1.7 times longer than UK manifestos. If the number of tokens is
weighted by the length of manifestos, where 1 UK word/token is equal to
1.7 US word/tokens, the difference is much less pronounced. The total
number of tokens in the US is 466, versus 357 in the UK.
The manifestos are roughly even in the proportion of text tokens dealing
with specific policies and non-monetary resources, while US manifestos are
more prone to making general statements about health policy. The crucial
results emerge from the analysis of statements on expenditures and effi-
ciency, however. American party manifestos are more prone to discussing
health care issues in terms of expenditures than in terms of efficiency; the
opposite is true for UK manifestos. Our content analysis—consistent with
histories of health care policy in the UK (see Ham 1999; Webster 1998)—
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suggests that efficiency considerations and arguments have occupied a pre-
eminent position in the discussion of health policy in the UK. Indeed, the
percentage of UK parties’ statements on the efficiency of health care ser-
vices is four times that of US parties.
The relative importance of efficiency considerations in the UK is high-
lighted in Figure 2, which illustrates the percentage of health policy tokens
concerned with efficiency and expenditures in the US and UK from 1964
to the present. With the exception of the late 1970s and early 1980s,
expenditure considerations always figure more prominently in US mani-
festos; and conversely, although the percentage of health tokens dealing
with efficiency in both countries is comparable in the late 1970s and early
1980s, the UK percentage is consistently greater than the US percentage
throughout the time period. The data here reveal a stark difference in the
way health care policies are framed and discussed in the UK and US, and
they even suggest the possibility of two distinct national policy styles as
regards health care.
It might be said that problem definition is a correlated, rather than a
genuine explanatory, variable. One might argue that an emphasis on effi-
Stuart N. Soroka and Elvin T. Lim
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Table 2: Content analysis of party manifestos
Health Care Topic Country
US UK
Party Both Party Both
Dem Rep Lab Con
1. General policy ref. 23% 31% 27% 18% 16% 17%
(91) (121) (212) (36) (24) (60)
2. Specific policy ref. 26% 33% 30% 31% 32% 32%
(106) (128) (234) (64) (49) (113)
3. Non-monetary 10% 6% 8% 8% 7% 8%
resources (39) (24) (63) (17) (10) (27)
4. Expenditures 33% 19% 26% 17% 20% 18%
(133) (73) (206) (35) (31) (66)
5. Efficiency 5% 7% 6% 25% 22% 24%
(21) (26) (47) (51) (34) (85)
# Tokens 404 389 793 205 152 357
# Manifestos 10 10 10 11 11 11
Ave # words/ manifesto 21,278 25,083 23,189 13,294 13,855 13,574
Note: Cells contain column percentages with raw figures in parentheses. Percentages 
may not add to 100% due to rounding. Results are based on content analyses of all party
manifestos from 1964 to 2001.
ciency in the UK is the product of having an established, comprehensive
health care system, since the potential for increasing expenditures is pre-
sumably going to be greater in less comprehensive health care systems
(such as the US). This institutional-size argument is implausible or at least
incomplete in light of the fact that the UK has spent comparatively little
on its health care system, however. There has certainly been scope for
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Figure 2: Health care discussion in party manifestos
increased expenditures: in 1998, the UK was ranked 18th out of 28 OECD
countries in terms of health expenditure per capita and 23rd in terms of
expenditures on health as a percentage of GDP.13 The interesting fact that
remains, therefore, is that, in spite of comparatively low spending levels
and public support for increased spending in the UK, spending increases
did not materialise.14 Institutional differences between the US and UK
cannot be the primary cause of differences in either trends in expenditures
or issue definition in the two countries.
Figure 2 further corroborates our problem-definition explanation for
differences in health care spending in the US and UK by illustrating the
trade-off between discussion of efficiency or expenditures, at least in the
UK. For most of the time period studied here, the percentage of efficiency
tokens tends to be higher when expenditure tokens are lower. Crucially,
this rather strong relationship need not exist, since there are three other
categories of tokens rising and falling over the time period. But the fact
that a link exists suggests that efficiency and expenditure are in direct com-
petition as themes for health care discussion in the UK.
We believe that it is telling that, despite clear public preferences for more
health care expenditure in the UK, such desired increases in expenditures
have not materialised at the same time that political actors in the UK con-
tinue to think of and frame health care policies increasingly in terms of
efficiency (organisation, management and efficacy). Indeed (as Figure 1
shows), as public preferences for increased health spending have soared in
the recent periods, so have (as Figure 2 shows) the salience of efficiency
arguments. It is as if these preferences repeatedly fail to register in the
minds of political actors because these cannot (or refuse to) get away from
viewing health care in efficiency terms. We suggest that the relative un-
responsiveness of health care policy to opinion in the UK is due, at least
in some part, to the lack of congruence between public preferences and
the way in which the issue is defined (and understood) by governmental
elites.
Discussion and conclusions
The aim of this article has been to examine and then account for differ-
ences in the strength of the relationship between public spending prefer-
ences and public health expenditures in the US and UK. An examination
of the opinion and spending series demonstrates that the link between pref-
erences and health expenditures is stronger in the US than in the UK. Time
Stuart N. Soroka and Elvin T. Lim
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series analysis suggests that, from 1975 to 1995, public preferences for
health spending had a much more significant effect on health spending in
the US than in the UK.
In order to account for this difference in policy responsiveness, we have
examined the way in which health policy issues have been defined in the
two countries. There appears to be a prevalent and cross-party sentiment
among American policy-makers that health policy decisions are firmly
linked to spending decisions. Indeed, when discussing policy, US policy-
makers are four times as likely to highlight expenditure considerations
rather than efficiency considerations.
Conversely, British policy-makers view health policy both in monetary
and especially in efficiency terms. We contend that there is a non-
accidental link between this finding and the fact that UK health spending
in the last three decades has been relatively unresponsive to public spend-
ing preferences. Differences in issue definition do not provide the only
explanation for differences in responsiveness; nevertheless, we believe that
the ways in which health policy is defined and discussed in the US and UK
help us to account for their different trajectories. Issue definition is mini-
mally a critical mediating variable in the relationship between public
spending preferences and actual government spending on health care.
We do not suggest that health care spending in the US and UK will nec-
essarily continue to reflect the relationship (or lack thereof) with public
opinion identified here. The UK electorate is not necessarily doomed to
health care expenditures that are perpetually unreflective of public senti-
ment. Indeed, in line with the increased emphasis on expenditures in 2001
election manifestos, the most recent Labour budget (April 2002) indicates
a major increase in health care expenditures. The budget introduces a 7.4
per cent average annual real terms growth in NHS spending for five years
and a 48 per cent real terms increase in NHS cash spending per house-
hold. The result may be a rise in health care expenditures dramatic enough
to match the overwhelming public desire for increased investment in the
NHS. So an analysis of the responsiveness of UK health policy to public
opinion in 10 years’ time may suggest quite a different story from the one
we have observed thus far.
For now, our analysis adds to the relatively scarce literature comparing
the opinion-policy link across countries and suggests one way in which 
different results might be accounted for. We cannot determine whether
problem definition caused the differences in policy responsiveness. Never-
theless, the preceding analysis points to an important difference in health
care policy-making in the US and UK and the data indicate a remarkably
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strong link between the definition of health policy issues in the US and 
UK and the responsiveness of health expenditures to public spending 
preferences.
Notes
Previous versions of this article were presented at the Centre for American Politics and Public
Policy, University of Washington, at the University of British Columbia, and at Nuffield
College, Oxford. The authors are grateful to audiences for comments, particularly to Frank
Baumgartner, Bryan Jones, David Mayhew and Christopher Wlezien, and to the Journal’s
anonymous reviewers. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.
1. There are two exceptions to this rule (Miller et al. 1999; Budge et al. 2001), although
neither addresses both public opinion and public policy per se. There is, however,
ongoing comparative work by Soroka and Wlezien (e.g. 2002).
2. For similar work outside the US, see Brooks (1987 and 1990) and Petry (1999).
3. For similar work on defence spending, see Jones (1994). For related work on relation-
ships between spending and the public’s ‘policy mood’, see Stimson et al. (1995) and
Erikson et al. (2002).
4. Both spending series were transformed into constant NCUs using Total Expenditures
on Health (TEH) deflators. All spending data were drawn from OECD Heath Data
2001. Since measures of spending can have significant effects on the results of these
models (given the comparatively small number of observations), we tested a wide variety
of other spending measures, using a GDP deflator, for instance, or measuring health
spending as a proportion of total government outlays or GDP. Results did not change
substantively in any case.
5. Gaps in GSS data are filled in using results from Yankelovich in April 1981 and from
the CBS News Poll in January 1992. There are no data available to fill gaps in the Gallup
(UK) series. For the time period used in forthcoming time series analysis (1975 to 1995),
then, US opinion data remain missing for 1995, and UK preferences data remain missing
for 1980, 1984 and 1994.
6. Differencing is a common method for avoiding the problems of integrated time series.
For more information, see Hendry, David, 1995. Dynamic Econometrics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).
7. The model used here is a relatively simple one, and by no means exhausts the possi-
bilities for additional independent variables.
8. Additional controls included a number of demographic and economic variables which
might contribute to changes in health care spending, such as GDP per capita, and the
proportion of the population less than 15 years and more than 65 years old. The rela-
tively small sample size precludes adding too many variables to the model, of course,
and it is likely that these trends are at least in part captured by the preferences variable.
In the US model, for instance, demographic variables are statistically significant and
reduce the power of the preferences variable somewhat. Complete results are available
upon request from the authors.
9. Others have drawn on the concept of policy styles. See Kitschelt (1986a and 1986b)
and Randall (1995).
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10. These are readily available in electronic format from various sites on the Internet. The
British manifestos were taken from <http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man.htm>, and
the American manifestos were extracted from the American Reference Library (CD-
ROM released by World Book).
11. For a recent description of the implementation and use of content analysis in the social
sciences, see Roberts (1997). For a recent study that uses party manifestos, see Laver
and Garry (2000).
12. For certain analyses, one might be concerned that many governments do not adhere
to—or are not held accountable for—policies described in their election manifesto. 
This concern is lessened somewhat by the growing body of work demonstrating 
relatively powerful links between manifesto statements and government policy-
making (Klingemann et al. 1994; Budge et al. 2001). In any case, this is not an 
issue in the current analysis since we do not need to assume that governments are held
accountable for their manifesto promises to hold that the way health care policies are
framed in manifestos essentially reflect the terms by which those policies are generally
discussed.
13. OECD, Health at a Glance (2001).
14. This is truer before 1990, however. In the past three elections, UK party manifestos
appear to have been more balanced in their discussion of both expenditures and effi-
ciency. The increase in both categories in 2001 is reflective of the importance of health
care issues in that election, and of the increasing attempts by parties to find solutions—
both delivery- and spending-related—to problems currently facing the NHS.
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